Virtue ethics is the oldest moral framework in Western philosophy — older than utilitarianism, older than Kant. Aristotle's question wasn't "what action is permitted by the rules" but "what excellent character looks like, and how do I cultivate it." Ethics, on this view, is about becoming, not deciding.
The virtues — courage, temperance, justice, practical wisdom, honesty, generosity — aren't arbitrary; they're the dispositions that allow a human being to flourish. Aristotle called this flourishing eudaimonia. You don't get there by following rules; you get there through habituation, practice, and the influence of others who are already further along.
The framework's strength: it makes ethics part of life, not a set of decisions you only think about in dilemmas. Its weakness: it doesn't tell you what to do when virtues conflict (courage vs prudence; honesty vs kindness), and "what would a virtuous person do" can become a recursive non-answer.
The modern revival — Alasdair MacIntyre, Martha Nussbaum, Rosalind Hursthouse — argues that the framework's apparent weakness is actually its strength: real moral life is messier than any rulebook, and what we need are excellent character, not flowcharts.